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The Role of the Transitional Leader: A Comparative Analysis of Adolfo Suárez and 
Boris Yeltsin  
 
Thomas O’Brien1 
School of Social and Political Science, University of Melbourne 
 
The role of leadership in transitional regimes is an issue that requires closer 
examination, given the ability of the leader to shape and determine the direction of 
the regime. This paper seeks to delineate some common features of leadership 
during such regimes and factors influencing the ability of leaders to manipulate and 
shift the direction of the process. To illustrate, the paper adopts a comparative 
analysis of the leadership of Adolfo Suárez (Spain) and Boris Yeltsin (Russia). It will be 
shown that, despite the different outcomes of these cases, there are clear 
similarities that point to the existence of a form of transitional leadership. Central to 
the paper is an adoption of the notion of structure and agency to determine the 
extent actors in this position can affect change within constraints faced. 
 
Keywords: transition, Suárez, Yeltsin, agency, structuration, transitional leadership 
 
The transitional period is one of instability and uncertainty, as actors seek to define 
the rules of the game and their position therein. Formal structures are seen as 
essential in providing a framework within which democratisation can take place, by 
generating certainty and stability.i This viewpoint, however, risks downplaying the 
importance of individual leaders in shaping the transition process by making 
democratisation appear formulaic. While these structures may constrain actors 
compared to the previous regime, their new and evolving nature gives actors greater 
scope for action than exists within a fully democratic system. 
 
During this period it is likely that a leader will emerge to shape the process, although 
not necessarily to a predetermined endpoint. The ability of such actors to shape the 
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emerging regime is enhanced by the changing character of the period; this makes it 
important to understand how such actors operate under such conditions. This paper 
identifies some of the key attributes of the transitional leader. The position put 
forward is that although Adolfo Suárez and Boris Yeltsin operated under different 
administrative systems, there are similarities that may allow for the development of 
a model of transitional leadership. These factors illustrate features that may be 
characteristic of this form of leadership, contributing to the further development of 
existing classification systems.  
 
Spain under Suárez and Russia under Yeltsin were selected as case studies based on 
the fact that both experienced lengthy periods of non-democratic rule, and the 
respective leaders emerged from successful careers in the preceding regime. Spain 
emerged from an authoritarian regime and established a parliamentary system and 
Russia emerged from a communist regime to implement a semi-presidential system, 
it will be shown below these differences do not invalidate the comparison and 
indeed strengthen argument for consideration of the actions of the leader.  
 
The paper is divided into three sections. First, it seeks to capture the core notions of 
leadership, transitions and the structure/agency debate. This will lay the ground for 
the idea of transitional leadership by locating it within a wider theoretical 
framework. It then moves to examine the actions of Suárez and Yeltsin respectively, 
identifying how they individually shaped the transition and structural features that 
may have limited their ability to act. Finally, the paper brings together the findings 
from each case to identify common features that may signify a specific form of 
transitional leadership distinct from more traditional forms. 
 
Building the Framework and Locating the Transitional Leader.  
The study of leadership is complicated by the need to examine the actions of varied 
individuals within differing social and institutional settings. Despite this there have 
been attempts made to create classifications of leaders based on common 
behavioural characteristics. The division of leadership styles into transactional and 
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transformative by Burns (1978) is particularly useful in this sense. This distinction 
sees leadership either as a means of exchange or to “shape and alter and elevate the 
motives and values and goals of followers” (Burns, 1978: 425). Leadership in both 
senses is more than simply power; it requires a sense of purpose and motivation to 
reach desired goals. While there are differing types of leadership, including 
charismatic, heroic, revolutionary, innovative, personal and individual among others 
(Elgie, 1995) the division between transactional and transforming is central to 
understanding transitional leadership. 
 
The division between transactional and transformative leadership styles has 
subsequently been argued to be more complex than Burns originally set out. It has 
been claimed that a leader may exhibit just one, both or neither of transactional 
and/or transformative qualities (Sashkin and Rosenbach, 1993). The ability or desire 
of a leader to exhibit a transactional or transformative style of leadership may also 
change over time as situations change. Reasons for such change are varied, but may 
result from the loss of faith in the ability of the leader to effectively lead in the case 
of the transformative leader. The core component of transformative leadership is 
seen to be charisma, as the leader inspires trust and respect, which are used to 
encourage desired behaviours. The possession of charisma may provide a 
temptation to use it for self-serving ends, moving towards a form of transactional 
leadership. Alternately failure of the stated higher goal may lead to a loss of 
charisma and as result legitimacy in the eyes of his/her followers. 
 
Political leadership entails the leader occupying a formal position and being able to 
affect the direction of events (Kellerman, 1984). Further to this it has been argued 
that political leadership is a form of leadership that implies the ability “to make 
others do a number of things (positively or negatively) that they would not or at 
least might not have done” (Blondel, 1987: 2-3). Central to these understandings is 
the ability of the leader to achieve change through the influence exercised over 
followers. This in turn requires that the leader possess legitimacy in the form of 
public confidence; without this he/she is unlikely to be able to introduce significant 
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change. The ability of a leader to act and the impact of decisions taken are also 
shaped by the operating environment. Environmental constraints range from custom 
and previous practice through to the administrative structure (Blondel, 1987), which 
can introduce constraints and provide opportunities. Agency of the leader is also 
limited by the agency of others, although this is determined by the relative strength 
of the actors involved (Dietz and Burns, 1992). Also important are the formal 
structures that the leader operates in, such as the issue of executive-legislative 
relations and the strength of the underlying bureaucratic structure. These structures 
can play either constraining or enabling roles, dependent on the relationship 
between goals being pursued and how these fit with the structures.  
 
A successful transition to democracy is seen to consist of three key phases, each of 
varying length, describing the shift from non-democratic regime to functioning 
democracy (see for example: Haggard and Kauffman, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; 
O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). First is the liberalisation phase where the regime 
opens the public sphere and lessens the use of repressive techniques. The next step 
is the actual transition, where the incumbent regime relinquishes (or is forced from) 
power and begins the introduction of democratic institutions. Finally, the transition 
is thought to be completed with the consolidation phase, the (re)introduced 
institutions and procedures become habituated and accepted by all participants 
securing the new system. However, the transition process is not guaranteed and it is 
possible for the transition to stall, go backwards or consolidate in a non-democratic 
form (McFaul, 2002a). Central to this process are the actions and decisions of 
leaders, as these set the priorities and direction of the transition process. 
 
The transitional period is by its very nature a time of fluidity, the rules and structures 
of the preceding regime are removed and new ones are developed and implemented 
in their place. In addition, the transitional period can see a redefinition of agency, 
with actors seeking positions within the changing political landscape. Adeney and 
Wyatt (2004: 7) argue that the ability of leaders to guide change through periods of 
‘critical juncture’ can explain the emergence of different outcomes. It has also been 
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noted that the success or otherwise of a leader must also be judged in the light of 
the decisions made and how these impact on the outcome of the transition 
(Pasquino, 1990). For these reasons it is important to understand the role of 
structure and agency in the transitional situation, if the interrelationship can be 
more clearly identified the process may be more stable and lead to more desirable 
outcomes. 
 
The notion of structuration is useful in this context, as it sees structures as being 
internal to the actor, consisting of “some kind of ‘patterning’ of social relations or 
social phenomena” (Giddens, 1984, 16). While it is acknowledged that individuals are 
“knowledgeable agents”, it also notes that they act “within historically specific 
bounds of unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of their 
actions” (Giddens, 1995, 265). While there are external factors that place limits on 
the ability of the leader to act,ii much of the agency is determined by the actions of 
the individual leader. In terms of power relations, relations of autonomy and 
dependence, Giddens notes that an agent cannot be completely autonomous or 
dependent, with even the most dependent actor retaining some autonomy (1979). 
This points to the fact that no leader is free from constraints, while the nature of 
these constraints (and how they evolve) is to a large extent determined by the 
actions taken. Considering the effect of actions taken is particularly significant in the 
transitional situation, the scope for change is greater and the predictability of 
outcomes is greatly reduced. For this reason it is necessary to consider closely the 
actions of the transitional leader, to determine what effect these have on his/her 
ability to shape the transition while maintaining control in the face of opposition. 
 
Drawing the connection between structuration and the transition process clarifies 
the issues leaders face during this time. As noted above, the very nature of the 
transition process means that there is a reduction in the strength of formal 
institutional structures, as these are altered and reshaped to meet the new situation. 
At the same time there is also an increased possibility of conflict, with participants 
seeing the uncertain future outcome as an opportunity to establish a better position. 
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In such circumstances the ability of the leader to establish clear rules and 
procedures, would seem to stabilise and enhance his/her ability to exercise agency. 
While this may limit the ability of the leader to act in the short-term, it can provide 
safeguards and certainty over the longer term, provided the boundaries are clear. 
Linking this back to structuration, it seems to confirm the notion that the leader is 
able to influence and shape his/her position in relation to both the structures and 
the outcomes that are achieved. 
 
The core of the dilemma that faces the transitional leader is the need to 
simultaneously destroy and create. There are parallels in this process with the notion 
of creative destruction posited by Schumpeter in relation to capitalist development, 
“incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (1976, 83). This 
is exacerbated in the transitional situation, as the change required is far more 
extensive. The structures and institutions that characterised the previous system are 
removed and are replaced by new ‘democratic’ equivalents. The success of the 
leader (from the point of view of transition theory) is based on the ability to 
effectively introduce such changes, while ensuring that they are stable. This is where 
the notion of transformative leadership comes into the picture; the role of the 
leader is to introduce change that will effectively ensure a smooth transition in the 
operation of the system. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the actions of the leader once in power, rather than on 
the events that led to the regime change. There is a need to consider the ability of 
individual leaders to shift the transition towards or away from consolidation through 
their actions. The challenge that faces the transitional leader is complicated, both 
externally, in the form of potential rivals and competing bodies, and internally, in the 
desire to exercise control over the political system and do away with potential 
challengers. Further to this, it has also been noted that institutions cannot and do 
not play a decisive role in democratic consolidation, they are more subject to 
revision than they appear (Alexander, 2001). The role of transitional leader is by its 
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very nature transformative, as it involves moving from one regime type to another, 
through the reforming of social and structural relations.iii 
 
A key issue that arises through the paper, is to what extent a transitional leader can 
maintain a transformative stance. In particular, once the key features of the new 
political structure have been established there is a need for further change, as the 
leader must move from guiding the political system introducing new structures to 
working within those structures. Whether such a change is possible, or whether the 
leader instead becomes obsolete is an open question; if the leader continues to 
pursue a strategy of attempting to dominate the political system the outcome is 
likely to be less than satisfactory. This is the issue at hand with regard to the 
transitional leader: the necessity to fulfil the role of charismatic leader fostering and 
guiding change to that of leader in times of ordinary politics.iv 
 
Adolfo Suárez and the Spanish Transition.  
Adolfo Suárez was clearly a transitional leader, as he oversaw and guided the 
transformation of the Spanish political system from a Francoist authoritarian 
structure to the beginning of a stable democracy. While the consolidation of 
democracy in Spain proceeded relatively smoothly, the outcome was far from 
predetermined. Much of Suárez’ success, can be attributed to his construction of 
and support for formal institutional structures. In order to determine to what extent 
the change can be attributed to Suárez, it is necessary to examine his leadership 
style and the constraints he faced during his time in power. This section will briefly 
outline the core components of Suárez’ rise to power and how he operated once 
there to effect change.  
 
The appointment of Suárez in July 1976 followed a period of instability and 
uncertainty, his predecessor (Carlos Arias Navarro) had sought to liberalise while at 
the same time maintaining the core elements of the Francoist regime. Central to the 
failure of this attempt at reform, was the inability to deal with the conflicting 
demands of social forces and regime hardliners (Preston, 1986). In order to deal with 
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the tension, King Juan Carlos appointed a technocrat who was acceptable to those 
seeking continuation, yet was open to the necessity for reform. During the first 
phase of his leadership (prior to the 1977 elections) Suárez was charged with 
fulfilling the program of Juan Carlos (under advisement of Torcuato Fernández 
Miranda), aimed at moving away from the Francoist system (Preston, 2005). This 
relied on Suárez using the legitimacy bestowed on him, through the support of Juan 
Carlos, to shift the regime while not antagonising those seeking continuity. 
 
During this initial period, Suárez began to reshape the political institutions and 
prepare the ground for the democratic regime. In order to ensure the legitimacy of 
the emerging political regime and his own leadership, he held talks with opposition 
leaders (including Santiago Carillo of the banned Communist Party) to show his 
intention to democratise (Hopkin, 2005). At the same time, he also sought to placate 
the hardliners within the regime, by working within the Francoist legal system. This 
period also saw introduction of a Law for Political Reform  (December 1976), which 
reformed the appointed parliament (Los Cortes Generales) into a bicameral body 
with free elections (Pierson, 1999). The Cortes voted in favour of the reform, 
following modification of the aims of the legislation and the addition of guarantees 
regarding future employment (Maravall and Santamaría, 1986). That Suárez was able 
to introduce these reforms while satisfying both sides, would seem to indicate his 
political skill. 
 
The other key change during this period, was the dissolution of both the political 
wing of the Franco regime (Movimiento) and the core feature of the corporatist 
structure (Sindicatos Verticales) (Maravall and Santamaría, 1986). Taken together, 
these actions signified a willingness on the part of Suárez to abandon the political 
structures that had raised him to the position he occupied, while introducing free 
and open competition within the altered political rules. His ability to do so has been 
linked to four specific assets: knowledge of bureaucratic structures; support of Juan 
Carlos; control over state resources; ability to exploit opposition divisions (Medhurst, 
1984). Together these assets provided Suárez with the tools necessary to begin the 
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reform, while at the same time protecting him from challenges (with the King 
effectively controlling dissent within the military). The other asset Suárez possessed 
was his ideological malleability, which meant that he was not tied to the Francoist 
structures and was willing to search for the best option available (Heywood, 1996). 
 
The 1977 elections saw a shift in the character of the regime and required a similar 
shift in Suárez’ own approach. Leading the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD - 
Unión del Centro Democrático), Suárez was able to gain a plurality, but not a majority 
in the Cortes. The core element of this period was the development of a Constitution 
to replace the Franco-era document. While the UCD maintained control over much 
of the drafting of the Constitution, it was still required to negotiate with the 
opposition parties to get the final draft approved. In cases of conflict between 
parties, much of the negotiations were conducted in informal meetings where 
leaders negotiated agreements and solutions to sticking points (Medhurst, 1984). In 
this way the Suárez government was able to develop a Constitution that fostered a 
sense of consensus, with only the right wing Popular Alliance (AP – Alianza Popular) 
and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV - Partido Nacionalista Vasco) refusing to ratify 
the final draft (Hopkin, 2005). This consensual style of leadership characterised the 
initial period, as the constituent groups worked together rather than risk 
polarisation. 
 
Before moving on it is necessary to examine the political system within which Suárez 
operated, as this was a significant constraining factor on his ability to act. Having 
legalised political parties in 1976, he had opened the way for opposition parties to 
emerge and participate in the political system. As noted above, Suárez was required 
to operate in a consensus model and cooperate with the opposition parties. While 
the Spanish Communist Party (PCE – Partido Comunista de España) under the 
leadership of Santiago Carillo was willing to support his reform program (due to its 
precarious position and a desire not to upset regime hardliners), the other major 
parties were less constrained. Both Felipe González and Manuel Fraga, leaders of the 
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and the AP 
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respectively, were in a position to operate more freely in opposition to Suárez. This 
was seen in the negotiations over the Constitution, where González was able to 
negotiate concessions and Fraga used his position to refuse to give the support of his 
party (Hopkin, 2005). Although Suárez was able to negotiate with these actors, his 
position was weakened by the ad hoc nature of the UCD. Despite this, he was able to 
push through the reform program, relying on his authority to call on the support of 
the population (moving beyond the strictly political arena), although this was 
tempered over time as he struggled to deal with economic and security issues (in the 
form of terrorism) (Fusi, 1982). 
 
Although Suárez was largely able to deal with constraints on his ability to act during 
the initial stages through negotiation and the development of consensual 
agreements, this changed following the 1979 election. This election saw support for 
the UCD fall, as the opposition parties began to establish a more stable presence. 
The fall can also be seen as the beginning of consolidation of the emerging 
democratic system, the associated norms were becoming accepted and embedded. 
The decline in the performance of the UCD has also been linked to Suárez’ specific 
style, restricting the UCD to “the party of Suárez” (Fusi, 1982). Following the 1979 
elections, parties of the right (AP) and the left (PSOE) sought to capitalise on the 
weakened position of the UCD and capture votes by moving towards the centre, 
signalling a shift from consensual to competitive politics (Hopkin, 2005). Faced with 
increasing pressure and reduced ability to act, Suárez moved towards a more 
transactional form of leadership, making deals in order to get his programme 
through. 
 
The decline of Suárez, ultimately resulting in his resignation in January 1981, was 
largely the result of his inability to make the change from transformative to 
transactional leader. While he was able to function from a position of strength, 
where he negotiated terms with a divided opposition, he was unable to effectively 
operate within a normal political environment (Fusi, 1982). As the concerns of the 
population shifted away from the extraordinary politics that had characterised the 
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transition, to everyday concerns such as economic performance, Suárez became 
increasingly unable to perform and responded by becoming increasingly isolated. In 
this way, Suárez can be seen as characteristic of the archetypal transitional leader, 
emerging to shepherd the process but fading when the task was complete. 
 
Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Transition. 
The role of Boris Yeltsin in the creation of the Russian Federation, following the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union was important. Although he did not remove the 
communist regime, he was responsible for reforming the institutions that had 
characterised it and introducing changes to move the country in the direction of 
democracy. His rise signalled a shift in the character of Russian politics, allowing the 
emergence of a strong actor under new rules. It also brought to power someone 
who was willing to use the means at his disposal, to gain control of and then shape 
the political system. This section seeks to outline the core elements of Yeltsin’s 
tenure, focusing on the initial transitional period that ended with the introduction of 
a new Constitution in 1993. 
 
Yeltsin can clearly be seen as a transitional leader, he emerged and challenged the 
existing structures and attempted to move the regime towards a democratic end. His 
ability to achieve this aim, was compromised by his inability and unwillingness to 
effectively use the position he had to introduce stability. The structure of the 
political system in the Russian Federation retained many of the features of that 
which had existed previously, centred on a strong parliament (Biryukov and 
Sergeyev, 1997). This was altered, when the Congress of Peoples Deputies (CPD) 
granted the President extraordinary powers for a period of one year, for the purpose 
of introducing rapid economic reforms. This change introduced uncertainty into the 
system; the new powers did not clearly specify the nature of the executive-
legislative relationship, thus leading to a case of dual power (Dunlop, 2001). By 
complicating the relationship, the CPD had lessened the structural constraints on the 
actions of the President. 
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A core component of the Yeltsin presidency was possession of charismatic authority, 
which had been gained during the failed August 1991 coup. Charisma is an essential 
component of transitional leadership, as the leader inspires followers to accept and 
support the reform direction. In Yeltsin’s case, the extent of his charismatic authority 
allowed him a significant degree of freedom to operate within the formal political 
system. This degree of freedom meant that his personality and beliefs loomed large 
as factors determining what decisions were made at the time (Breslauer, 2002). This 
would seem to fit within the notion of transitional leadership (albeit at the stronger 
end), as the President was able to use the uncertainty of the period to introduce 
what he saw as necessary reforms, calling on his charismatic authority for support. 
 
The formation of a presidential-vertical structure, that directly challenged the power 
and authority of formal institutions and actors, also complicated the picture. This 
structure allowed the President greater freedom to disregard and distance himself 
from unwanted views and advice (Robinson, 2000). It has been noted that this 
effectively constituted a parallel government under the control of the President 
(Huskey, 1995). While this structure insulated Yeltsin from the criticisms of the other 
elements of the political system, it reduced his ability to work with these groups 
when required. It has also been noted that Yeltsin’s refusal to engage with the 
parliament was compounded by the absence of political discipline, through the lack 
of political parties and the internal division of the centrist coalition (Breslauer, 1993). 
Together these features led to a polarised zero-sum approach to politics being 
adopted by participants, with submission to the will of the opposition (or 
compromise) seen as unacceptable. 
 
The reform of the political system required during the transition was a complicated 
one, and required sequencing. Faced with a number of significant challenges in 
reforming the existing structures, the administration chose to address Russian 
independence and economic reform, rather than reforming the political system. It 
has been argued that had the administration chosen to focus on reforming the 
political system first, the conflictual relationship that emerged between the 
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executive and legislative branches may have been prevented (Dunlop, 2001; McFaul, 
2002b). Yeltsin’s decision not to identify with a political party and claim to be above 
politics, meant that he had little stake in the parliament or its decisions (Barnes, 
2001). By distancing himself from the parliament and government, he ultimately 
undermined his standing by preventing the emergence of a parliamentary group 
willing to support the executive. Dunlop further argues, that if persons of roughly 
compatible viewpoints had controlled the parliament and presidency, a compromise 
may have been possible (2001).  
 
Following on from the uncooperative nature of the relations between parliament 
and the presidency, the conflict that ended the First Republic of the Russian 
Federation can be seen in a clearer light as a continuation and escalation of an 
existing pattern, rather than as a distinct change in direction. The conflict between 
branches developed to such a degree that there was a constitutional deadlock, the 
President refused to give up the extraordinary powers that had been granted, and 
the legislature refused to recognise his desire to enshrine these powers in a new 
constitution. Neither branch was willing to step down and give the impression that it 
had submitted to the other (Shevtsova, 1999). Faced with this deadlock, the 
President took the extra-constitutional step of dissolving the parliament and 
introducing new constitutional rules. This action and the subsequent shelling of the 
parliament buildings, showed the willingness of the President to maintain power at 
almost any cost. 
 
While the President was able to exercise almost total control over the drafting of the 
Constitution, he was unable to determine the outcome when elections were held. 
The President had moved from a position of strength, where he possessed support 
of both the legislative branch and the wider population, to one where these groups 
were against him (Shevtsova, 1996). The new Constitution created a form of super-
presidentialism, where the divisions that had led to the downfall of the First Republic 
(absence of clear separation of powers) were replicated, with the President holding 
the balance due to his new formal powers (Colton, 1995; Dunlop, 2001). The fact 
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that he was unable to generate support in the election, subsequently losing control 
of the political system, clearly illustrates the point noted by Burns, power does not 
on its own equal leadership (1978).  
 
The changed position of the President, confirms the notion within structuration 
theory that structure and agency are not mutually exclusive. While Yeltsin was faced 
with constraints, in the form of an antagonistic parliament, his actions created 
constraints that eventually led to the closing of opportunities to exercise the power 
he did have. By antagonising his opponents, he encouraged them to consolidate and 
over time find ways to challenge and undermine his position, limiting the extent to 
which he was able to rely on formal institutions. His reduced ability to act was clearly 
illustrated under the new Constitution, with the emphasis on “consolidation of gains, 
rationalisation of administration within the new structural context, political isolation 
of anti-system forces, and popular adaptation to the system as constructed” 
(Breslauer, 2002: 184). This was a clear shift away from structural reforms, 
highlighting the weakened nature of his position. 
 
Transitional Leadership in Spain and Russia. 
Both Yeltsin and Suárez sought to accomplish both the destruction of the old system 
and the creation of a new one, although with very different degrees of success. 
Breslauer accurately notes, “[r]are is the leader who is able to succeed in both 
system destruction and system building” (2002: 263). This difficulty has been 
identified as the core of the dilemma facing the transitional leader, the need to 
simultaneously destroy and create. From the preceding analysis, it is clear that both 
leaders had an important role to play in shaping the transition to democracy. This 
section attempts to compare the impact each leader had on the transition process, 
as well as how this was enhanced/limited by the decisions they made during their 
time in power. The focus adopted seeks to illustrate how their actions ,identify a 
common form of transitional leadership. 
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The nature of the pre-transition regimes and the problems that arose from these are 
important determinants in the outcome of the transition process. However, these 
differences are not the sole reason for the outcome of the transition process. Both 
leaders assumed the leadership at a time when the transition was balanced between 
continuation of the preceding non-democratic regime (albeit in different form) and a 
move towards something new. The Spanish political system was emerging from a 
period of personalist authoritarian rule, with a strong desire for continuity among 
some elite groups. This acted as a constraining influence on Suárez, restricting his 
ability to introduce wholesale change. Yet, at the same time there was also pressure 
on him to introduce change, from both outside and within the regime. By contrast, 
Yeltsin operated with a greater degree of freedom; his role in the August coup had 
discredited opponents seeking continuation and granted him significant charismatic 
authority.  
 
A key difference between the two leaders in the initial transition period, can be seen 
in their reaction to existing structures. By dismissing the structures out of hand, 
Yeltsin limited the opportunity for his challengers to use legal means, opening the 
way for extra-constitutional actions. The use of formal powers by the two leaders is 
an important point of difference at the core of the analysis. While it has been noted 
that Yeltsin faced a far more determined opposition than Suárez, it can be argued 
that this was a result of his actions (Heywood, 1996). Yeltsin relied on informal 
powers and sought to circumvent the formal structures, which presented the 
possibility that his actions may be restricted (Robinson, 2000). By relying on informal 
networks and charisma, Yeltsin undermined respect for the rule of law and limited 
the legitimacy that the regime was able to generate. This clearly contrasts with the 
Suárez regime, where the formal institutions and structures were respected and 
opposition groups were incorporated into the political system, although this was due 
to the presence of other actors with whom he was forced to negotiate. The 
significance of this difference is that Suárez’ actions reduced the level of uncertainty 
and tensions, while those of Yeltsin exacerbated tensions in an already 
indeterminate phase.  
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Another feature that must be considered, in determining the ability of the leaders to 
shape the political system, was the form of the political institutions that each faced. 
Much has been made of the effect of presidential and parliamentary structures on 
the ability of a regime to move effectively to democracy (see for example: Linz, 1990; 
Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Although it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake a detailed analysis, it is necessary to 
consider the effect of different institutional settings. Suárez operated in a 
parliamentary system with a supportive head of state (Juan Carlos), he was also 
required to work with the legislature in order to get his reform program through. 
The effect of this was a more cooperative form of leadership, he was required to 
take into consideration the perceptions of other actors, their opposition would have 
reduced his ability to act. In Russia, the semi-presidential structure created a degree 
of ambiguity that Yeltsin was able to manipulate to his advantage. Although he was 
constitutionally subordinate to the CPD, amendments allowed him to gain a foothold 
and consolidate power, beyond the control of both the legislature and the 
government. This was formalised with the 1993 Constitution and encouraged actors 
to view the competition for power as a zero-sum relationship, with the 
strengthening of any group being seen as a loss by the other. In light of this, it is 
clear that the institutional structures determined (or at least provided the 
opportunity to determine) the nature of the relationship that developed. Each leader 
possessed significant power to shape the system; the difference was how they chose 
to use those powers in the relationship with the legislative branch. 
 
Moving beyond the specifics of the cases and examining the underlying behaviour in 
terms of leadership, the picture becomes more complicated. While the two leaders 
possessed very different capacity to shape the system (with Yeltsin having far freer 
reign), there are some striking similarities that point to the possibility of a form of 
transitional leadership. Both leaders were able to generate a degree of charismatic 
authority from their position as Prime Minister and President respectively, they in 
turn used this to shape the emerging democratic system as they saw fit. While 
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Suárez operated within the structures that were being established and Yeltsin 
outside, their leadership paths appear to follow similar trajectories. Both leaders 
were able to introduce significant reforms in a short period of time, but as the 
transition progressed their ability to act became constrained by the context in which 
they operated. Suárez was restricted by the formal institutions, particularly the need 
to form coalitions to maintain power, while Yeltsin was restricted by the constant 
struggle for power. 
 
Although the eventual outcome appears to be different in the two cases, with Suárez 
resigning in 1981 and Yeltsin holding power until 1999, this also masks similarities. 
Suárez was forced to resign from power due to his inability to deal with increasing 
economic problems and a rise in terrorist activities by ETA. Yeltsin was able to hold 
on to power and introduce a Constitution heavily weighted in his favour, but became 
increasingly impotent in the face of constant challenges. This would seem to indicate 
the inability of each actor to cope with the move from radical transformational 
politics of the initial transitional period, to the more stable politics of normal 
government. In the case of Suárez, it would also seem to indicate the relatively 
delicate position he occupied, with the emerging problems and growing strength of 
opposition overwhelming his position. It is the contention of this paper that this 
pattern is likely to be repeated in other cases of transitional leadership, as the leader 
struggles to make the change to something more akin to transactional politics as the 
need for structural reform is reduced. 
 
The preceding analysis shows that the actions of the respective leaders were 
significant in shaping the transition process. This section has also indicated that, 
although they faced different issues and structures they still possessed similar 
abilities to shape the political system. It is clear that the degree of agency varied 
significantly across time and issue, but was still possessed by the leaders. The 
difference between the two, comes when the pattern of their actions is considered, 
with Suárez choosing to rely on and utilise formal institutional structures, while 
Yeltsin sought to circumvent them and change relations between branches into a 
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zero-sum game. It has been argued, along these lines, that one of the most 
important contributions of the transitional leader is to respect the rules of the game 
and place “‘systemic’ considerations above and before ‘partisan’ motivations” 
(Pasquino, 1990: 127). The analysis also seems to indicate, that where a leader works 
within the ‘rules of the game’, his/her ability to act is enhanced through the stability 
and certainty generated by the structures in which they are participating. 
 
Conclusion. 
From the preceding analysis, it is clear that both Suárez and Yeltsin had important 
roles to play in shaping their respective transitions. It is also clear that both leaders 
adopted a different approach when dealing with the issues faced, this in turn shaped 
the outcome of the transition in each case. Despite this, there are similarities in their 
style of leadership that point to a form of transitional leadership. Using Burns’ 
conception of transactional and transformative leadership (1978), it is clear that 
both leaders moved to a more transactional form of leadership, as their ability to call 
on their followers to support the reform program decreased. 
 
An important component of the leadership in both cases, was the way in which they 
engaged with other actors and institutions in the transitional political system. This 
can be tied to the relative success of the transition; Suárez’ willingness to work 
within the structures strengthened them. By contrast, Yeltsin chose to circumvent 
these structures, leading to polarisation and instability. The effect of this on 
leadership can be seen, Yeltsin was less able to rely on these institutions, while 
Suárez was able to use them to ensure his leading role. These results illustrate the 
ability of individual leaders to strengthen (or weaken) their ability to operate, by 
shaping the environment within which they operate. 
 
Transitional leadership is also significant, given the apparent failure of these leaders 
to adjust to the normalisation of politics. Where the transition moves to 
consolidation and the need for substantial reform is no longer necessary, there is a 
need for the leader to adjust. In both cases, the leader was unable to make the 
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change while maintaining a transformative leadership style and as a result withdrew 
to focus more on personal goals, becoming more transactional. It is necessary to 
conduct a more extensive review of transitional leadership to determine whether a 
similar pattern can be observed more generally. 
 
 
i See for example: O’Donnell, G. and P. Schmitter, (Eds) (1986) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; 
Haggard, S. and R. Kaufman, (1995) The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Przeworski, A. (1991) Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Linz, J. and A. 
Stepan, (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
ii
 Layder (1993) for example notes that structuration theory does not adequately address institutional 
constraints that lie beyond the direct control of the individual. 
iii It has been pointed out that the leader may be little more than a figurehead in the transitional 
situation. While this is a valid observation the leader in this context is given greater freedom to operate 
due to the changing nature of the transition process. 
iv The move from transformative leadership to something more normal is not an opposing binary 
relationship. The leader can remain a transformative leader or become something more akin to the 
transactional leader. However, the completion of the core tasks of the transition process means that the 
transitional leader must adapt to the changed situation and this seems to be the point at which problems 
occur. For a summary of the issue of binary choices in leadership see Collinson, 2005. 
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